But with the escalation of aacks, many came to feel the need to "engage their critics, admit mistakes, open up their data and reshape the way they conduct their work" (Broder 2010) . A last minute session, co-organized by President of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), Ralph Cicerone, was convened at the 2010 annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) under the title "Ensuring the Transparency and Integrity of Scientific Research. " Remarkably, reports of the session-e.g., in Science and the New York Times-laid out the problem in a manner that seemed to accept skeptics' claims about the significance of the stolen e-mail messages. While clearly critical of the media's role in sensationalizing these events, the participants agreed to accept their share of the blame, acknowledging carelessness and the need for even greater oversight on the part of the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). John Broder wrote for the New York Times that scientists "are learning a lile humility and trying to make sure they avoid crossing a line into policy advocacy, " quoting Cicerone as saying that they "must do a beer job of policing themselves and trying to be heard over the loudest voices" (2010).
This response was widely seen as indicating a new willingness among scientists to engage their critics, as a step toward a more democratic relation between science and society. I am all in favor of greater engagement with the public; but am dismayed to find scientists apparently so ready to propitiate this upsurge of hostile aacks. Propitiation is not engagement. Self-criticism must not be allowed to obscure the fact that climate scientists' own confidence in their findings has not been shaken. They well know that these events were outrageously manipulated, and for blatantly political purposes. Why then such defensiveness? Why the apparent readiness of responsible media, and even of some scientists, to accept these "revelations" as evidence of misconduct-rather than, say, as evidence of the human nature of scientific inquiry? Readers are not told, for example, that the infamous IPCC error slipped through despite an extraordinary (and probably unprecedented) system of oversight that was built into the IPCC rules of procedure. The presence of such an error is evidence not of misconduct, but of the fallibility of all systems of oversight, however rigorous and demanding.
If scientists bear some responsibility, I suggest it is for their adherence to an image of science as infallible, capable of delivering absolute truth (and thus value-free)-an image that most scholars now recognize as indefensible and that, among themselves, most scientists acknowledge is unrealistic. In dealing with non-scientists, however, and especially where politics threatens to intrude, this is the image of expert authority that almost always comes into play. The assumption of a strict separation of fact from value has critically informed our traditional views about the proper relation between science and politics: the responsibility of scientists is to determine facts, untarnished by any moral, political, or religious agenda, and their role in policy making is simply to provide those facts. In this view, the only appropriate response to conflicts between science and society is more effective dissemination of information and improved science literacy.
Indeed, it is the very embroilment of science and policy around climate change that seems to provoke ever more insistent demands for the separation of fact and value. By contrast, I suggest that the image of a science whose authority depends on its absolute certainty and value-neutrality (a) underlies much of the confusion in the public perception; and (b) hinders climate scientists in responding effectively to the challenges they now face.
But if traditional assumptions can no longer be defended, what is to replace them? There is by now a substantial literature on the value of democratizing the relation between science and the public and enhancing dialogue among different stake-holders, most of which runs smack up against the dilemma of expertise. If we cannot draw a sharp line between knowledge and interests, then just what is the role of expertise in deliberations among different stakeholders? How are we to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate criticism?
These questions come home to roost with such urgency in the arena of climate science because of the particular character of this science and the particular implications its claims have for us. It is precisely because the implications of climate research are so huge that the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate criticism has become so intensely politicized; it is also because of the magnitude of what is at stake that we must, somehow, find a way to make this distinction.
Clearly, we cannot do so without the help of experts. But just how much expertise is required for legitimate criticism, what ought to count as expertise, and, above all, is that expertise trustworthy? Skill, their experience and training are surely part of the answer, but Sheila Jasanoff reminds us that we also "trust experts because they supposedly represent our interests and are accountable to us, but we need to evaluate the basis for that trust from time to time" (Wheatley 2008) .
Have the scientific claims about anthropogenic global warning been "proven"? Do all climate scientists agree? And if not, why should we believe these claims? Contrary to popular image, uncertainty and doubt are the daily diet of scientific researchers. On what grounds then do their conclusions warrant confidence? In the absence of a methodology for guaranteeing absolute truth, certainty and proof, working scientists employ a variety of practical measures to maximize their chances of "geing it right"-including both formal and informal criteria against which to test the quality and strength of their evidence, and a code of ethics designed to ensure the trustworthiness of their reports. Necessarily, application of these criteria requires judgment, and just in any other endeavor, good judgment depends on expertise and experience.
No scientific analysis is immune to uncertainty, but the ways in which uncertainty enters the analytic process multiply dramatically with the complexity of the problem under study. As everyone knows, climate change is an especially complex phenomenon and even aer decades of study, our understanding of climate change remains far from complete. Climate is the product of a huge number of variables interacting over long time periods in extremely complex ways. Efforts to understand this process-to determine what variables are most important and how they interact-depend both on empirical measurements of relevant variables and on models of the physical dynamics governing their interaction, with constant exchange between the two. Recognition of the role that human activity may play complicates the task further. The resulting models require our largest computers for analysis, but they give us our best shot at understanding past, present, and future climates. The predictions they make possible are far from certain, but without them we would have no chance at all of anticipating the future; they cannot tell us what will happen, but they offer estimates of what, under various scenarios, future climates are likely to have in store for us, and with what odds.
Lay readers expecting definite answers are bound to be disappointed: but climate scientists, even when informally deploying the language of truth, by and large recognize this language as a shortcut for saying that the evidence is strong enough to warrant a working assumption of truth. Of course, judgment of just how strong the evidence needs to be for this purpose will vary, and there is ample room for debate. But the hope is that, as the evidence grows stronger, consensus can ultimately be achieved.
Importantly, scientists' confidence in their ability to contribute to the overall progress of scientific knowledge does not depend on absolute certainty or complete consensus: to resolve persistent disagreements among themselves, they rely on practices of open deliberation, collective criticism, and peer review. In relation to outsiders, however, scientific authority is not nearly so democratic. By tradition, the right to criticize is limited to those with sufficient training and research experience to evaluate the relevant evidence and arguments-such as to members of a disciplinary community who are the peers responsible for reviewing and evaluating papers for publication. Of course, members of such a community share similar viewpoints and make similar assumptions, and necessarily so. These are the assumptions that underlie the ongoing process of mutual evaluation that is a basic part of all research practice-in effect, the self-policing of the disciplinary community. They also underlie the extra levels of evaluations that have been added for the very multi-disciplinary venture we call climate science. Finally, it is because their claims have survived all these levels of scrutiny that most climate scientists have the confidence they have in their measurements, calculations and predictions. Yet, even so, there is still dissent, and even so, they could still be 1 First and foremost, for the IPCC, and second, for the independent reviews undertaken by national commiees such as the NAS.
wrong.
What most worries so many climate scientists, however, is not the possibility that they could be wrong, but the magnitude and seriousness of the implications of their findings should they be right. No one knows how bad things could get-how hot, how flooded, how drought-stricken, how unstable-nor can anyone say whether the cost in human lives by the end of the century, should we fail to act now, is likely to be in the tens or hundreds of millions (or even billions). We only know that the most likely consequences would be horrendous. How large a risk, then, are we willing to tolerate? This question points to the vital difference between climate change and other familiar clashes between science and politics that are sometimes invoked as parallels: evolutionary theory, for example, or theories of planetary motion. Neither the future of evolution nor of planetary motion depends on what people believe about these theories. Here, however, the future may depend critically on what people believe, and hence are willing to do. Indeed, it is the link between belief and action on the one hand, and the magnitude of the potential consequences of inaction on the other, that set climate science apart. So how should climate scientists respond? Confident that they have the expertise to distinguish between information and misinformation, they are generally dismayed by the diffusion of blatant misinformation. But if readers are not prepared to grant them authority, what can they do? Their commitment to resolving their own disagreements internally, their formal gate-keeping mechanism of peer review, establishes a base line of reliability and grounds their expertise; although the outcome is not absolute, it has passed the most stringent tests available. But this, now, is clearly not enough.
The view of scientific authority as resting exclusively on internal evaluation inevitably discourages scientists' engagement with lay critics; to the extent that their authority depends on separating science from politics, fact from value, venturing into the public domain may seem to put their very credibility at risk. Yet there are obvious problems with such restraint. For one, internal reliance on peer review leaves unaddressed the question of what is to be done about the free dissemination of misinformation. Peer-reviewed journals (which preponderantly support the conclusions of the IPCC) are not read by the non-specialist audiences that climate scientists most need to reach. Such audiences vary greatly, but they share an insulation from the professional literature that greatly contributes to the skepticism we are now seeing.
projections. Even readers without the relevant technical background can make the sorts of discrimination needed to establish trustworthiness.
In other words, I am arguing that, where the results of their work have direct impact on the public, scientists have a particular responsibility both to provide a candid, accessible, and meaningful account of their findings and the implications of those findings to that public, and to respond to whatever concerns persist. I see no reason why this responsibility need in any way conflict with scientists' responsibility to their peers, nor do I see any reason why they cannot draw on the professional authority they have already established in extending that authority to a wider audience. When Freeman Dyson complains to readers of the New Y ork Review of Books that climate scientists tend to exaggerate the dangers of climate change (see, e.g., Dyson 2008) , these scientists have a responsibility to respond. Perhaps more urgently, it is their responsibility to combat, piece by piece, the misrepresentations brought in support of the recent aacks on the integrity of climate scientists and of the IPCC, and to show readers just why the popular accounts and even the very naming of "Climategate" are so misleading.
What I am proposing is far from a solution. But if it succeeds in encouraging climate scientists to take the lead in breaking through our current impasse-both because they are best placed and equipped to take on the task, and because their responsibility qua scientists obliges them to do so-it is a start.
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